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NATIONAL SAVING AND INTERNATIONALINVESTMENT
ABSTRACT
This paper extends earlier work by Feld.stein and Moriok.a on the relation
between domestic saving rates andinternationalcapital f lows or, equivalently,
between domestic saving rates and domestic investment.Thebasic conclusion of
the present analysis is that an increase in domestic saving has a substantial
effect on the level of domestic investment although a smaller effect than would
have been observed in the 1960s and 1970s. The savings retention coefficient
for the 1980-86 period is 0.79. down from 0.91 in the l960s and 0.86 in the
1970s.
The more closely integrated economies of the EEC also appear to have more
outward capital mobility (i.e., a lower saving retention coefficient) than
other OECD countries.
There is no support for the view that the estimated saving-investment
relation reflecta a spurious impact of an omitted economic growth variable.
Althoughbudget deficits are inversely related to the difference between
privateinvestment end private saving, we reject the view that this reflects an
endogenoua response of fiscal policy in favor to the alter-native interpretation
that the negative reletion is evidence of crowding out of private investment by
budget deficits. This interpretation is supported by the evidence that
domestic investment responds equally to private saving and to budget deficits.
The implication of the analysis thussupportsthe original Feldstein-
Horiokaconclusion that increase in domestic saving does raise a nation's
capital stock and therefore the productivity of its workforce. Similarly, a
tax oncapital income is not likely to be shifted fully to labor and land by
the outflow of enough capital to maintain the real rate of return unchanged.
Martin Feldstein Phillipe Bacchetta
NBER BrandeisUniversity
1050 Massachusetts Avenue Department of Economics
Cambridge, MA 02138 Waltham. MA 022341.INTRODUCTION
Do tax policies that stimulate a nation's private saving rate increase
its domestic capital stock or do the extra savings flow abroad? Does an
intrease in the corporate tax rate cause an outflow of capital that shifts the
burden of that tax increase to labor and land?
Theae were the two key questions that motivated the 1980 Feldstein—
Horioka (PH) study of the relation between domestic saving rates and domestic
investment. PH reasoned that if domestic saving were added to a world saving
pool and domestic investment competed for funds in that asne world saving
pool, there would be no correlation between a nation's saving rate and its
rate of investment. The statistical evidence showed that, on the contrary.
the long—term saving and investment rates of the individual industrialized
countries in the OECD are highly correlated. The data were consistent with
the view that a sustained one percentage point increase in the saving rate
induced nearly a one percentage point increase in the investment rate.
Much has happened in the international capital markets during the decade
since the Feldstein—Horioka study was done. The l980a saw an unprecedented
increase in the international flow of capital to the United Statee. Capital
market barriers in Japan and Europe have been lowered or eliminated. This2
experience raises the question of whether the empirical regularity observed
for the l96Os and 1970a continued through the 1980s. Even those studies that
followed Feldstein—Horioka1 were limited to data for the l970s or the early
1980s. One purpose of the present study is to examine the experience for the
period 1980 through 1986 and to compare the results with the analysis for
earlier years.
1.1 International Caoital Mobility end Risk Aversion
The initial PU peper created confusion about the interpretation of the
results by discussing them as evidence about international capital mobility.
Economists who believe that the evidence on interest arbitrage implies that
there is perfect capital mobility were therefore inclined to reject the FH
findings. Fortunately1 Jeffrey Frankel (1986) clarified the issue by
reminding everyone that perfect capital mobility does not imply the
international equalization of çgj, interest rates.2
-
Morespecifically, as Frankel pointed out, the interest arbitrsge
condition of integrated capital markets refers to nominal interest rates only.
Perfect capital mobility implies equal cx ante real interest rates only for
time periods for which the expected change in the exchange rate equals the
difference in the expected inflation rates. As Frankel stresses, since cx
ante purchasing power parity may not hold even for periods as long as a
decade, the existence of perfect capital markets (in the sense that the
1 These include Feldstein (1983), Caprio and Howard(1984), Murphy
(1984), Penati and Dooley (1984), Sachs (1981), and Summers (1988). See
Dooley et al. (1987) for a summaryofthese results,
2 For a more complete discussion of theee issues,see the essay by
Frenkel in the current volume,3
interest differential between two countries is equal to the expected change in
the nominal exchange rate) does not imply a continuing equality of expected
real interest rates. An increase in saving in one country that gives rise to
an equal increase in its investment need not violate the nominal interest
arbitrage condition even though it causes a decline in the real interest rate.
Purchasing power parity does not appear to hold even in the long run that
is relevant for the tax policy questions that motivated this research. But
even if it did, in that very long run the difference between the nominal
interest rates in each pair of countries may no longer equal the expected
change in the exchange rate because of inveator risk aversion. An investor
looking ahead for ten years or more must be concerned about risks of changes
in tax rules on foreign source income or even in political institutions that
can affect the velue of hia international investments. Opportunities to hedge
the interest rate or exchange rate risk on long—term positions are far more
limited than for short—term positions, or at least have been until quite
recently. For such long horizons, investor risk aversion may induce portfolio
investors to prefer investments in their own currency. As a result, expected
real interest retes may also differ internationally in the long run.
In a risklesa world, long—term nominal interest rate arbitrage could be
achieved even though international investors only took net positions in the
short—term market if domestic investors arbitrsged short—term end long—term
domestic interest rates. Once risk is introduced, however, arbitrage by
hedged international short—term investors and the equilibrium of risk—averse
domestic investors who hold both long—ten and short—tens securities is not
enough to provide international equality of long—term rates.4
As an example, a mean—variance investor will allocate his wealth among
assets in proportions that vary positively with yield and inversely with risk.
An investor who has a high degree of risk aversion or who attributes a large
subjective variance to long—term investments in foreign assets may want to
invest a large share of his portfolio in domestic assets (depending on asset
yield covariances) even when a substantial expected yield difference exists in
favor of the foreign assets. Since the mean—variance investor's optimal
proportional allocation of the assets is independent of the total value, an
increase in saving that raiaes the total pool of funds will be invested
primarily in the domestic economy.
In abort, there is no presumption that real long—term yields would be
equalized even if all investors were completely free to invest wherever in the
world they want. Moreover, broad classes of financial institutions (and, in
some countries nonfinancial corporations as well) are in fact not permitted
by regulatory authorities to take net positions in foreign currencies. Many
nonfinancial corporations also choose to avoid net foreign exchange exposure
as a matter of policy rather than to evaluate the opportunities available at
each point in time, The absence of these substantial pools of funds from the
potential pool of arbitrage funds would not be important if other investors
were risk neutral, However, if the remaining investors are risk averse, the
limited size of the mobile pooi of unhedged funds increases the potential
importance of risk aversion and therefore the scope for expected real rates of
return to remain unequal.1.2 Government Policies and the Current Account
Although the lack of cx ante purchasing power parity and the risk—
aversion of international investors are sufficient to permit domestic ssving
rates to influence substantially the rate of domestic investment, the observed
link between saving and investment may also reflect explicit government policy
decisions.
It is easy to understand why governments would want to restrict the size
of trsde imbalances in general and of changes in trade imbalances in
particular. Since an increase in the merchandise trade deficit means a loss
of exports and the eubstitution of imports for domestic production. the
affected domestic industries are likely to seek government actions to shrink
the trade deficit. A decrease in the merchandise trade deficit caused by a
spontaneous increase in the demand for the country's exports may be welcome if
there is excess capacity in the economy but would be resisted by the
government as a source of inflation if there is not excess capacity. Since a
rise in exports in a fully employed economy also means a fall in the
production of other goods end services, the industries producing for the
domestic market are likely to seek policies to reverse the rise in exports.
These arguments refer to changes in the trade balance rather than to its
level. Why should a government resist a long—run current account deficit or
surplus? One answer is that en economy that starts in trade balance will not
went to shift to a long—run imbalance because of its reluctance to accept the
dislocations involved in changing the pattern of production from trade balance
to trade imbalance. But there are also reasons why a government would resist
a long—term trade and current account imbalance in addition to the prohlems of
transition.6
Because of capital income taxes, a persistent capital outflow diverts
domestic savings to investment abroad that has a lover return to the
originating nation, Each government therefore has an incentive to seek a
capital inflow and to resist the outflow of its own capital.
A country with a trade surplus and a capital outflow also has the
opportunity to trade a reduction in the trade surplus for a higher level of
real income (through an improvement in the terms of trade) and a temporarily
lower level of inflation (through the favorable "supply shock" of an increase
in the level of the currency)
There are s variety of policies that governments can use to shift the
economy toward trade and current account balance. In the short run, monetary
policy can be used to influence the exchange rate and the level of economic
activity. Summers (1988) has suggested that governments may tailor the size
of the budget deficit to offset differences between private saving and
investment. Other possibilities include the usa of targeted tax policies
designed to increase or decrease the level of investment or private saving:
the investment tax credit, the schedule of depreciation allowances, the
availability of special tax preferred savings accounts, a difference in the
tax rates on capital and labor income, etc.
1.3 ImvlicaiJ.cj. for the Effects....of Fiscal Policies
The reason that saving and investment are closely correlated is important
for answering the questions that motivated the original study.
Consider the Summers hypothesis that the close correlation between
investment and savings reflects the response of government deficit policy co
shifts in private investment and saving. If a cax change thatencourages7
private saving is offset by an increase in the government budget deficit,
there is no rise in capital formation. If however the close correlation
between saving and investment reflects either the reluctance of private risk
averse investors to move capital abroad (so that private investment rises
automatically) or a government tax policy to stimulate private investment
until it absorbs all of the increase in domestic saving (rather then permit a
capital outflow or a contraction of national income), the tax induced rise in
seving does get converted into greater domestic capital formation.
The reason for the observed saving—investment correlation is also
important for assessing whether a tax on investment income causes a capital
outflow that perrzits the incidence of the tax to be shifted to labor. If the
observed saving—investment correlation reflects the unwillingness of risk—
averse domestic investors to shift capital abroad, the increase in the capital
tax causes a fall in the net of tax rate of return and thus no shifting of the
tax burden. In contrast, if the savings—investment equality occurs because of
a government decision to increase the budget deficit to absorb the capital
that would otherwise go abroad, leaving just enough domestic saving to finance
a level of investment at which the after—tax return is equal to the after—tax
return abroad, the tax is fully shifted.
In support of the "endogenous deficit policy" hypothesis, Summers
presents a regression for a cross—section of industrialized countries of the
average deficit—CNP ratio for the period 1973 through 1980 on the average
private savings—investment gap (the difference between net private savings and
net private investment) for those same years. He finds a coefficient of 0.72
and concludes that it implies that 72 percent of the net savings gap may be
offset by an explicit hudget deficit policy.There ie however a quite different interpretation of the Summers deficit
regression. If the long—run level of the budget deficit is thought of as
exogenous (reflecting political considerations in the county rather than an
attempt to offset the savings—investment gap), then the regression may only
reflect the impact of the budget deficit on the level of investment. This
would be the traditional crowding out of private investment by government
deficita. Summers presents no evidence or reason to think that his regression
should be interpreted as a policy response function rather than as a
description of the crowding out of private investment by government deficits.
We return to this in section 5 below.
1.4 Statistical Estimates
First however we will turn to the evidence on the link between savings
and investment in the most recently available data. We also take this
opportunity to consider whether the correlation between savinga and investment
is equally strong for different subsets of countries within the OECD,
including separate analyses for the EEC and non—EEC countries.
Previous comments on the FH regressions raised the issue of the poasible
endogeneity of national aavings rates. This was actually discussed in the
original Fl! paper and estimates using instrumental variables provided as a
check on the possible bias from this aource. The instrumental variables were
demographic and social security variablesThe resulting coefficient
confirmed the ordinary least squares results. Since this issue has been
explored rather thoroughly in the earlier paper, we will not present such
instrumental variable estimates in the current analysis.9
Wewill however examine two other issues in some detail. -The first is
the suggestion by Obstfeld thst the observed correlation may reflect the
-
coamoninfluence of economic growth on both saving and investment. We
replicate the Obstfeld analysis in section 3 and show that although it can in
theory explain the observed sevings—investment correlation, the ectual data
are not consistent with the Obatfeld hypothesis.
The second is an analysis of the dynamic adjustment process by which
savings snd investment adjust to changes in the savings—investment gap. We
show in section 6 that the process cen be described as an adjustment of
investment to close the gap end not an adjustment of savings. We also present
some evidence that suggests that the desired gap is not zero in all countries
but that countries adjuat investment to close the difference between the
actual savings—investment gap and s preferred gap.
-
2.15 CAPITAL MARKETINTEGRATION INCREAflZGl
Thereduction in government barriers to internationalcapital flows, the
creationof extensive new hedging markets, and the growing sophistication of
financialinstitutions around the world have increased the likelihood of net
capital flows. The sharp fall in the U.S. national saving rate in the 1950s
(due to both the increased budget deficit and the decline in private sawing)
also provided a major incentive for the shift of capital to the United States.
The evidence in this section indicates that there has in fact bean a
substantial decline in the correlation between the rates of gross domestic
saving and gross domestic investment. However, the effect of additional
domestic saving on domestic investment remains quite substantial. Even in- the10
l980s, each dollar of additional saving is associated with an increase in
investment of more than 50 cents.
The analysis is based on tha regression equ.ation
(1.1) —a0+a1
where is gross investment (as defined by the OECD and including inventory
investment), Y is gross domestic product, and is gross saving. The
estimates use data for 23 OECD countries (excluding Luxembourg). The unit of
observation is a single country and the data for that country has been
averaged over a group of years. The coefficient a1 that indicates the
proportion of the incremental savings that is invested domestically will be
referred to as the "savings retention coefficient."
Consider first the estimates for gross investment presented in colwsn I
of table 1. In the decade of the l960s, each extra dollar of domestic saving
increased domestic investment 91.4 cents with a standard error of 6.3 cents.
For the next decade this had declined to 80.5 cents with a standard error of
12.1 cents. The decline of 10.9 cents is, however, less than the 13.6 cent
standard error of the difference. The seven available years of the l9SOs
shows a further decline to 60.7 cents with a standard error of 12.6 cents.
Although the 19.8 cents decline from the l970s is only slightly larger than
the associated standard error of 17.5 cents, the pattern of continuing decline
from the 1960s implies a more significant relation. Prom the 1960s to the
1980s the decline of 30.7 cents is more than twice the standard error
associated with this difference.11
Another way of comparing the earlier and later parts of the 27 year
sample period is to contrast the earlier fixed exchange rate years (1960—73)
with the later floating rate years (1974—86). During the earlier 14 years the
savings retention coefficient was 0.911 (standard error 0.066), barely
different from the result for the decade of the l960s. The coefficient for
the later 13 years was however 0.669, much more similar to the coefficient for
the 1980s. The difference of 0.242 is approximately 1.5 times its standard
error.
The final row of column 1 shows that, for the 27 yeer period aa a whole,
the savings retention coefficient was 0.791 with a standard error of 0,094. A
potentially interesting line of analysis that we have not pursued would be to
test whether the investment—savings relation has changed at a constant rate
during this period or has had significant step changes after the beginning of
the floating rate period or in the decade of the 1980s.
The net saving and investment relations (shown in column 2 of Table 1) do
not indicate a fall over time similar to the corresponding gross saving—
investment coefficients. The key ssvings retention coefficient only declines
from 0.913 in the 1960s to 0.864 in the l970s and 0.792 in 1980—86; none of
the differences, including the difference between the 1960s and the l980s, is
a as large as its standard error.
This difference between the gross and net saving—investment relations
masks a more complex difference between the changes over time in the European
Economic Community (EEC) countries and among the non—EEC industrial countries
of the OECD. The differences in experience among different groups of
countries is the subject of the next section of this paper.12
3. CAPITAL FLOWSAND TEE EEC
Although capital might in principle flow with equal ease among all
countries or at least all industrial countries, the availability of market
information the existence of institutional relationships, and the perception
of risk might make capital flows greater among some pairs of countries than
among others. More specifically, in the current context, each extra dollar of
saving in one country may be divided between the home capital market (which
gets the largest share) and other individual national capital markets in a way
which depends on a variety of institutional and other country—specific
factors.
We have explored this possibility by looking separately at the
investment—saving equation for nine of the European Economic Community
(excluding the new entrants Spain and Portugal, aa well as Luxembourg) and
the investment—saving equation for the remaining 14 OECD countries. It should
be emphasized that the EEC savings retention coefficient does not reflect the
extent of the capital flow among the EEC countries but rather the extent to
which individual EEC countries retain their national saving within the saving
country.
Consider first the behavior of the investment—savings relation in the
nine EEC countries shown in columns 3 and 4 of table 1. The gross savings
retention coefficients, shown in column 3, are lower among the EEC countries
than for the entire OECD group and decline much more rapidly between the l970s
and the 1980s. The decline from 0.742 in the 1960s to 0.652 in the 1970s was
not large but this was followed by a sharp decline to only 0.356 in the 1980—
86 period. By comparison, the coefficients of the 14 non—EEC members of the
OECD were 0.962 in the 1960s, 0.810 in the l970s and 0.578 in the l980s.13
We should caution, however, that the standard errors of the coefficients
for the EEC countries are quite large since each ia based on only nine
observations. Thus the sharp decline frost 0.652 in the l970s to 0.356 in the
1980a is only two—thirds as large as its standard error of 0.456. We cannot
reject the hypothesis that there was no change. Even the fall from 0.742 in
the l960s to 0.356 in the l9BOs is only slightly greater than its standard
error of 0.359: the hypothesis of no change cannot be formally rejected with
this smell sample. The test however is of low power because of the small
sample size and we would ersphasizs the large decline rather than its
statistical 'insignificance."
When we shift from gross to net saving and investment, the pattern of the
savings retention coefficients differs even store sharply between the EEC and
non—EEC countries. As already noted, among the OECO as a whole, the net
saving—investment relation shows virtually no change between the early and
later periods (see column 2). In contrast, column 4 shows that the net
saving—investment coefficients declined sharply within the EEC between the
1970s and 1980s. This contrast is seen most clearly when the EEC coefficients
of column 4 are compared with the non—EEC coefficients of column 6.
Although the small sample of EEC countries makes it difficult to draw any
firm conclusions, these data appear to indicate that there have been greater
capital flows out of the individual EEC countries (i.e. ,asmaller share of
incrementalsaving is retained within the saving country) thanamong the non—
EECcountries and that the extent of this capital mobility increased in the
l9BOa.
We have also exsmined the saving—investment behavior in the wider group
of all 17 European OECD countries (columns 7 and S of Table I) and in the non—14
EEC European OECD countries (columns 9 and 10). The results shows that the
non—EEC European countries behaved more like the EEC countries than Like the
non—European members of the OECD.
These results are not only interesting in themselves as an indication of
the increasing integration of the European capital markets but also suggest
that the reason why the savings retention coefficients are generally much
greater than rero reflects the extent of informational and institutional links
among the capital markets. The coefficient is lower for the EEC countries
despite formal barriers on capital exports in some countries because of the
strength of institutional links. Even when capital is completely mobile in
principle, actual capital flo's are retarded by ignorance and risk aversion.
4. TIIL"MI$SING" GROWTH VARIABLE
The surprising strength of the savings retention coefficient in the
original FR study led subsequent researchers to postulate that the strength of
the coefficient may reflect the impact of come missing variables that
influence investment and are correlated with savings. Obstfeld (1986) has
developed the idea that the missing variable may be the growth rate of GDP or
a combination of the GDP growth rate and of labor's share of national income.
Life cycle theory implies that these twovariab].esdetermine the long—
term behavior of a country's saving rate. Obstfeld posits a model in which
the rate of output growth is also an important determinant of the country's
rate of investment; although demand—determined variations in output growth may
have an important influence on the timing of investment, in the current
context of comparing long—term differences in national investment rates we
would be more inclined to regard output growth as the result of previous15
capital investment than to look upon output growth as an exogenous
determination of investment. Obstfeld (1986) used data on GDP growth and on
the ratio of employee compensation to national income in individual OECD
countries to simulate the saving—QDP ratios and inveatieent—CDP ratios for
those countries that would result in a simple theoretical model. He then used
these simulated investment and saving ratios to estimate statistically the
basic investment—savings ratio.
The Obstfeld model assumes complete world capital mobility; that is, the
only link between ssvings and investment in each country is that they depend
on common variables. Nevertheless, a regression of the simulated investment—
CDP rstio on the simulated seving—CDP ratio produces coefficients that are
approximately equal to one, with the precise coefficient depending on the
group of countries selected.
Although we regard this as an ingenious demonstration of how the observed
investment—savings relation might in P.rinciple be just a spurious reflection
of the missing growth and income distribution variables, we do not find it
convincing. The real test of whether the savings variable is just a proxy for
the growth and distribution variables is whether the inclusion of growth and
distribution causes s significant change in the savings retention coefficient
in a regression using the actual saving and investment variables instead of
the simulated ones.
To test this in a way that makes it strictly comparable to Obstfeld's
analysis we began by following his procedure to create synthetic saving and
investment vsriables. We usedobservations for the saccountries and years
as Obstfeld. Despite the usual OECD dats revisions, we found that we were
able to reproduce his results quite closely. For example, with a sempla of 1716
countries for the period 1970 through 1979, Obstfeld found a savings retention
coefficient of 0.86 (with a standard error of 0.81) and we found a coefficient
of 1.01 with a standard error of 0.78. Adding the product of the growth and
income distribution variables to the Obatfeld synthetic equation caused the
savings absorption coefficient to become —0.75 with a standard error of 0.10
while the other variable "explained" the variation in the synthetic investment
series,
However, when we replaced the synthetic variables with the actual saving
and investment variables, the estimated savings retention coefficient was
little affected by adding the growth and distribution variables to the
equation. More specificaily with the ssme Obstfeld sample of countries and
years, but using the actual saving and investment data rather than the
synthetic ones, the estimated coefficient of the savings variable was 0.88
(with a standard error of 0.12) in the basic regression. Whenthegrowth and
distribution variables were added to the equation, the coefficient of the
saving variable because 0.87 (with standard error of 0.13).
Similar results were obtained with other combinations of growth ratss and
income. In no case did the inclusion of the growth and distribution variables
substitute for the effect of the savings variable as a determinant of domestic
saving.
The implication of this is clear. Although the estimated savings
retention coefficient could in theory reflect only the indirect effect of
omitted growth and distribution variables, the evidence indicates that this is
not so.17
S. BUDGET DEFICITf
As we wrote in section 1. Summers (1988) has noted that there is an
alternative possible explanation for the observed relation between investment
and savingd rates. Summers suggests that if governments do not like capital
outflows or inflows, they might adjust their budget deficits to offset the gap
between investment and private saving.
As evidence for this possibility. Summers presents a regression of the
ratio of the budget deficit to GDP on the difference between the private
savings ratio (i.e. .theratio of domestic savings plus the budget deficit to
CDP) and the investment—GDP ratio:
(5.1) DEF/Y —b0+b1(PS —
whereDEF is the general government budget deficit (i.e. ,theOECD measure of
general government saving with the sign changed), PS is private saving (i.e.,
saving as previously defined plus the budget deficit) and I and 'I are
investment and gross domestic product as previously defined.
For a sample of 14 countries for the period 1913 through 1980 Summers
obtained a coefficient of O.72. Taken at face value, this would imply that
each dollar of the private saving—investment gap induces governments to
increase their budget deficit by 72 cents. Since the precise sample used by
Summers is not known, we reestimated his equation 5.1 with data for 13 OECD
The text of Summers paper does not specify the sample of countries or
years for which his regression was estimated but elsewhere in his paper he
indicates that en equation using the deficit variable as an instrumental
variable is limited to this sample of countries and years because of data
limitations.18
countries for which dats are available for the period 1973 through 1980. The
estimated coefficient of 0.68 with a standard error of 0.15 is quite close to
the original estimate by Summers.
There are, however, serious problems of interpretation of equation 5.1.
Although such a model of deficit adjustment may have merit as a description of
short—ten stabilization policy, we find it very implausible as an explanation
of why long—term differences in budget deficit ratios persist among countries.
A more likely explanation of the correlation between budget deficits and net
saving ratios is that budget deficit ratios are "exogenous" (reflecting
political and historical characteristics) and that high deficit ratios crowd
out private investment in the traditional way. Similarly, countries with
budget surpluses may "crowd in" more private investment.
To assess the plausibility of this alternative specification, we reorder
the variables of equation 5.1 and estimate the equation:
(5.2) I/Y —c0+c1DEF/Y +c2P5/!?.
This is a natural generalization of the basic equation (1.1) that divides
domestic saving into two components: private saving (PS) and government saving
(—DEFY The original basic model implies that the coefficients c1 and c2 are
equal in absolute value but opposite in sign with private saving having a
positive effect and the budget deficit a negative effect.
The results, presented in Table 2, are generally consistent with this
generalization of the original basic model. For example, with the largest
possible sample (13 count±ies for 1970 through 1985) the coefficient of net
private savings is 0.699 with a standard error of 0.112 while the coefficient19
of the budget deficit is —0.865 with a standard error of 0.150. taken at face
value, these coefficients imply that each dollar of gross private saving adds
70 cents to gross investment while each dollar of the budget deficit crowds
out 0.87 cents of investment.
The higher absolute coefficient on government deficits than on private
saving is what would be expected if governments are likely to invest lass when
they face a budget deficit end to invest wore when tax receipts are large
relative to current spending. To see this, note that total investment
includes government sector investment (Ig) as well as private sector
investment (In) while the government deficit is defined as the difference
between government current outlays and taxes. Assume that private investment
depends on the total pool of national savings net of government borrowing for
both current and investment outlays;
(5.3) I/Y —a+$ (T—C—
tg
+PS)/Y+
whereT is total tax revenue of the government. Note that this implies that
government investment does not directly reduce (or increase) private
investment but does so only through the domestic availability of funds.




Aregression in the form of equation 5.2 is thus equivalent to estimating the
true" equation 5.4 with the last term omitted. The relstion between the20
estimated coefficients a1 and a2 of equation 5.2 and the parameter fiof
equation 5;4 depends on the relation between, government investment end the
other two variables. If government investment does not depend on the level of
private saving but does respond positively to government current budget
surpluses, the estimated coefficient of the government surplus variable
• (T-C)/Y will equal the true coefficient (fi)plusthe product of (1—fl) and the
regression of Ig/Y and (T—C)/Y. This implies that the coefficient of the
government surplus variable (—c1 of equ.ation 5.2) will exceed the coefficient
of the private saving variable (c2 of equation 5.2), The bias is, however,
relatively small. If the true" coefficient fiis0.75 and the long—run
propensity of the government to spend current surpluses on government
investment is as large as 0.4, the estimated value of —c1 will be 0.85 instead
of 0.75.
In practice, the difference between the estimates of —c1 and a2 is not
statistically significant with a sample of only 13 observations. Estimating
the constrained equation for this sample produces a coefficient of 0.76 on
domestic saving with a standard error of 0.09. Comparing the sums of squared
residuals for the constrained and unconstrained specifications implies an P
statistic of 0.81 with 1 and 10 degrees of freedom. Since the critical value
for 5 percent significance is 4.96, we cannot reject the simple original
specification.
Note that the estimate of c2 is an unbiased estimate of the true
parameter firegardlessof the size of fiandof the governments propensity to
do public investment as a function of the government's current surplus as long
as the government investment is not influenced by the private ssving rate.21
The problem of distinguishing between the "deficit reaction function -
approach"of equation 5.1 and the "components of domestic saving" approach of
equation 5.2 cannot be definitively resolved by these estimates aince the
statistical problem is one of identification and, more fundamentally, of
providing the theoretically correct specification. It is helpful in this to
look at the underlying raw data in the context of what we know about the
particular economies.
Table 3 presents data on the deficit, net private saving and net
investment for the decade of the l970s and the period 1980—84. Such data are
only available for 13 countries.
It is noteworthy that in the l9lOs the "deficits" were negative in all of
the countries except the United States and Belgium. The other countries had
surpluses ranging from one percent of COP to seven percent of COP. By the
l980s, most of these countries were experiencing actual deficits. it would be
very interesting but beyond our capability to examine the historic reasons for
these shifts country by country.
Consider however the case of the United States which went from a deficit
of one percent of OMP in the 1970s to 3 percent in the first half of the
1980g. For the l970s. the U.S. deficit was the largest of all 13 countries;
indaed, none of the others had a deficit. It is hard to argue, however, that
this represented a fiscal policy decision aimed at supporting aggregate demand
since inflation was e serious problem during most of this dacade end there was
a general feeling that national saving was too low. While it might in theory
be argued that the shift to e larger deficit in the l980s was a way of dealing
with the large recession in 1980—82, the actual historic record shows that the
recession was the unintended consequence of a political inability to obtain22
sufficient domestic spending cuts to pay for the combination of tax cuts
defense spending increases, and higher interest payments on the national debt.
One caveat should be indicated about this analysis. Government deficits
reflect payments of interest on the national debt because such interest
payments are part of current government outlay. Since inflation differences
among the countries influence the interest rates on the government debt, the
deficits reflect to differing degrees the inflation erosion of the government
debt and are in this sense not "true" deficits. This is likely to be more
important in the international context than over time in individual countries.
To examine the sensitivity of our conclusions to the fsilure to adjust
for inflation, we have repeated the analysis using inflation—adjusted
government deficits and private ssvings using data constructed by Mullen and
Price (1984) (as given by Roubini snd Sachs (1989). The inflation—adjusted
results are very similar to the unadjusted estimates. Using data for the
largest avsilable sample (13 countries for the period 1971 through 1986), the
disaggregstsd savings coefficients are almost exactly equal in absolute value:
(3.5) 1/'?—0.019—0.89DEF*/Y +O.8BPS*/Y
(0.012) (0.14) (0.10)
where DEF* and PS are both inflation adjusted. The evidence clearly supports
the view that either source of variation in national saving has the same
effect on domestic investment.23
6. DYNAMIC ADJUSTMENT
AsFeldstein (1983) and Feldstein—Horioka (1980)emphasized, theclose
relationship between domestic saving and domestic investment is a long—term
characteristic and does not hold trots year to year. With time series data,
the savings retention coefficients are much loser than in cross—section
analyses.
It ia possible however to examine the dynamic adjustment process by which
the close association between domestic investment and domestic asving is
maintained. The evidence presented in this section supports the view that it
is domestic investment that responds to changes in domestic saving. The
evidence is not consistent with e view that domestic saving (either private
alone or the combination of private and public) responds -to shifts in
investment.
Consider therefore the simple adjustment process by which the change in
the investment ratio from year to year (1fi —1t—lt—lvaries inversely
with the previous year's investment—savings gsp (Il—S..l)/Yl:
(6.1) Itf'Yt —t—lt'1t—l—do + d1't—l —
Ifan increase in the gap between investment and saving causes investment to
decline, d1 is negative. Such a decline could be caused by a rise in interest
rates induced by the "shortage" of savings in year t—l. The evidence
presented below shows that d1 is in fact negative, supporting the view that
investment responds to shifts in saving.24
Asimilar regression shows that the saving rate does not respond to the
gap between investment and savings. For this purpoae, we estimate the
equation
(6.2) St/Yr —St_1/Yt_i—e0+ e1 Tt—l —St1)/Yt1.
Althougha shortage of saving could raise saving by increasing the interest
rate or inducing an increase in the government surplus, the evidence auggeet
that this do-es not occur. Of courae, this is quite consistent with much
previous evidence that investment ia more sensitive to interest rates than
saving.
-
Theresults are presented in Table 4. Equation 1 presents the reeulta
corresponding to equation 6.1 for the 23 OECD countries (i.e., all OECD
countries except Luxembourg) for the period 1961 through 1986. The
coefficient of —0.227 (vith a standard error of 0.026) implies that an
investmenc-aavings gap of one percentage point of COP causes the investment—
GDP ratio to fall by approximately a quarter of a percentage point in the
following year. After three years the adjustment of inveatment alone would
reduce the gap to less than one half a percent of COP; after six years, 80
percent of --the gap would be eliminated.
The corresponding saving equation is presented es equation 2 of table 4.
The coefficient of —0.036 is small both absolutely and relative to its
standard-error of 0.024 and of the wrong sign. The data thus imply no
responae of the saving rate to the savings—investment gap.
Diaagg-regating the adjuatment coefficient into aeparate coefficients for
lagged investment and lagged saving supports this interpretation of the25
evidence. In the unconstrained investment equation (equation 3 of Table 4)
the coefficients of the lagged investment ratio is —0.275 with a standard
error of 0.028 while the coefficient of the lagged saving variable is 0.198
with a standard error of 0.027. The coefficients are close enough in magni-
tude to be equal for practical purposes. Rut if the point estimates are taken
literally, the evidence implies that a rise in the savings ratio induces a
slightly smaller rise in subaequent investment that a fall in the investment
ratio. This is just what might be expected if the stochastic disturbance
contains a serially correlated determinant of investment.
Dividing the sample into the fixed rate first half (1961—73) and the
floating rate second half (1974—86) shows that the results are similar in both
subperiods. with aoae indication of a slower response in the second half than
in the earlier period. These results are shoun in equations 5 through 8 of
Table 4. This confirms the results presented in section 2.
The constant terms in equations 6.1 and 6.2 imply that the investment and
saving ratios would adjust monotonically over time even if there were no
investment—savings gap. Since there is no justification for such a trend, we
have also estimated the equations of Table 4 with the constraint thet there is
no constant term. The results are very similar to the coefficients of Table 4
and are not presented to save space.
We have also repeated thia dynastic analysis for the nine EEC countries
alone. The basic results, presented in Table 5, are very similar to the
result for the entire OECD. Investment adjusts to the lagged investment—
savings gap while saving does not adjust. The coefficients for the EEC also
imply a small savings retention, confirming the results in section 3. The
other principal difference between the two sets of results is that the26
unconstrained coefficients euggestchatthe effect of an increase in saving is
smaller than the effect of an increase in investment. This may reflect only
the bias referred to above that results ifthedisturbance is serially
correlated.
- -
Itwould be worthwhile to examine the adjustment process more exten-
sively, consideringmoregeneral adjustment dynamics and using estimation
methods that are consistent in the presence of serial correlation, although
that may provide little reassurance with such small samples.
6.1 Persistent Current Account Imbalances
The specification of equation 6.1 implies that each country will adjust
its investment to eliminate eventually the entire investment—savings gap. A
more general specification would recognize that countries may instead have a
"normal' nonzero level of current account surplus or deficit to which they
adjust.
We consider therefore the following generalization of equation 6.1:
(6.3)1t/t —It1/Yt1
—f0+f1((It_1—St_1)/Tt_1—2)
where CAP isthe desired or normal investment—saving gap. Equation 6.3is
only distinguishable from equation 6.1 when the CAP is permitted to vary among
countries.
Equation 6.3 has therefore been estimated with individual constant terms
foreach ofthe 23 CECDcountries using datafor1961 through 1986. Separate
estimates for the aubperiods 1961—73 and 1974—86 have also been calculated.
The results are presented in Table 6.27
Equation 1 of Table 6 corresponds to equation 6.3 for the entire period
1961. through 1986. Equations 2 and 3 correspond to the two subperioda.
The individual constant terms correspond to substantial positive "normal"
or "target" investment—saving gaps in several countries including Australia,
New Zealand, Portugal, Greeca, Turkey, Denmark, and Ireland. There were fewer
countries with negative target investment—saving balances, but these included
Germany, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands end, since 1974, Japan. It is
clesr that these "normal" or "target" investment—saving balances do correspond
generally to the economic situations of the countries with the lower income
countries more likely to seek capital inflows while the high saving and older
industrisl countries correspond to a target excess of saving over investment.
7. CQNCUISJON
The basic conclusion of the present analysis is that an increase in
domestic saving has a substantial effect on the level of domestic investment
although a smaller effect than would have been observed in the 1960s and
1970s. The more closely integrated economies of the EEC also appear to have
more outward capital nobility (i.e., a lower saving retention coefficient)
than other OECD countries.
There is no support for the view that the estimated saving—investment
relatiom reflects a spurious impact of an omitted economic growth variable.
Although budget deficits are inversely related to the difference between
privateinvestment andprivatesaving, we reject the view that this reflects
an endogemous response of fiscal policy in favorof the alternative
interpretationthat the negative relation is evidence of the crowding out of
private investment by budget deficits. This interpretation is supported by28
-the evidence that domestic investment responds equally to private saving and
budget deficits.
Thedynamic adjustment analysis supports the view that domestic
investmentadjusts rather quickly when there is an- unwanted investment—savings
gap while domestic ssving shows little tendency to adjust.
The implication of- the analysis thus supports the- original Feldatain'—
Horioka conclusions that increases in domestic saving do raise a nation:"a
capital stock and thereby the productivity of its workforce. Similarly, a tax
on capital income is not likely to be shifted to labor and land by the outflow
of enough domestic capital to maintain the real rate of return unchanged.29
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Period Countries (#) Deficit Private Saving
1970—85 13 —0.865 0.699
(0.150) (0.112)
1965—84 9 —0.948 0.747
(0.153) (0.124)Table 3
Budget Deficits, Private Savings, and Invesunents
1970—79 1980—84
Deficit SavingInvestment Deficit Saving Investnten
Germany —0.03 0.10 0.13 —0.01 0.08 0.09
Austria —0.05 0.11 0.17 —0.02 0.09 0.12
Switzerland —0.04 0.14 0.16 —0.03 0.14 0.14
Netherlands —0.03 0.13 0.15 00l 0.12 0.09
Sweden —0,07 0.03 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.07
Finland —0.07 0.06 0.15 —0.03 0.07 0.11
Belgium 0.00 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.08
Spain —0.03 0.12 0.16 0.01 0.09 0.10
U.K. —0.01 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.04
Australia —0.05 0.11 0.17 0.01 0.04 0.09
Canada —0.01 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.12 0.10
U.S. 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.05
Japan —0.04 0.18 0.22 —0.03 0.14 0.17
All figures are expressed as ratios to gross domestic product.
Investment and ptivate saving are net variables.Table 4
DynamicAdjustmentof Investment and Saving in 23 DECO Countries
Dependent Coefficient Coefficient of Laaaed:
Equation Variable Constrained Period Invastment Saving
1. Investment yes 1961—86 —0.227 0.227
(0.026) (0.026)
2. Saving yea 1961—86 —0.036 0.036
(0.026) (0.026)
3. Investment no 1961—86 —0.275 0.198
(0.028) (0.027)
4. Saving no 1961—86 —0.014 —0.068
(0025) (0.024)
5. Investment no 1961—73 —0.344 0.262
(0.048) (0:045)
6. Saving no 1961—73 0.034 —0.083
(0.039) (0.037)
7. Investment no 1974—86 —0.240 0.140
(0.037) (0.036)
8. Saving no 1974—86 —0.025 —0.132
(0.036) (0.033)Table 5
DynamicAdjustmentof Investment and Saving in 9 LEG Countries
Dependent Coefficient Coefficient of Lagged:
Equation Variable Constant? Period Investment Saving
1. Investment yes 1961—86 —0,159 0.159
(0.042) (0.042)
2. Saving yes 1961—86 —0.015 0.015
(0.037) (0.037)
3. Investment no 1961—86 —0.225 0.123
(0.045) (0.042)
4. Saving . no 1961—86 —0.059 —0.055
(0.040) (0.037)
5. Investment no 1961—73 —0.222 0.083
(0.087) (0.078)
6. Saving no 1961—73 0.064 —0.160
(0.065) (0.058)
7. Investment no 1974—86 —0.216 0.071
(0.055) (0.055)
8. Saving no 1974—86 —0.090 —0.115
(0.051) (0.050)
The 9 EEC oountries exclude Spain, Portugal, and Luxemburg.Table 6
Normal Investment—Savings Caps in OECD Countries
Equation No: (1) (2) (3)
Time period: 1961—86 1961—73 1974—86
Lagged
Investment —0335 —0.422 —0.349
Csefficient: (0.030) (0.049) (0.044)
Lagged
Savings 0,335 0.422 0.349
Coefficient: (0.030) (0.049) (0.044)
Normal Cap:
(in percent)
U.S. —0.21 —0.31 —0.14
U.K. —0.03 0.55 —0.75
Japan —0.54 1.64 —2.94
Germany —1.64 —1.07 —2.07
France —0,28 —0.26 —1.55
Italy 0.12 0.14 0.20
Canada 1.37 2.11 0.63
Australia 2.33 1.52 3.24
New Zealand 4.21 3.35 4.91
Switzerland —2.09 0.50 —4.73
Spain 0.30 0.69 —0.37
Portugal 2.74 0.76 4.50
Belgium -.0.33 —0.33 —0.37
Netherlands —1.94 -0.83 —2.90
Greece 3.16 5.95 —0.32
Turkey 3.22 2.25 3.90
Sweden —0.21 —0.69 0.49
Denmark 2.15 1.97 2.38
Finland 0.89 1.23 0.63
Norway 1.97 1.99 1.92
Iceland 1.85 2.41 1.29
Austria —0.03 0.45 —0.55
Ireland 5.28 4.13 6.02